1、<p>　　Review of Development Economics, 9(4), 530–548, 2005</p><p><b>　　中文3730字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： FDI and the Capital Intensity of “Dirty” Sect

2、ors: A Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven Puzzle </p><p>　　出 處： Review of Development Economics 2005, Vol. 9, No.4, 530–548 </p><p>　

3、　作 者：Matthew A. Cole & Robert J. R. Elliott </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　(節(jié)選自第1頁(yè)第2段至第5頁(yè)結(jié)尾)</p><p>　　外商直接投資與“骯臟”部門的資本強(qiáng)

4、度：</p><p><b>　　污染避難所之謎 </b></p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　隨著世界一體化的逐步加深，貿(mào)易壁壘的消除意味著環(huán)保法規(guī)在塑造國(guó)家的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)方面發(fā)揮比以往更大作用。如果國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力雖隨著法規(guī)的不同而有所不同，那么改變貿(mào)易方式或企業(yè)搬遷（外國(guó)直接投資）可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致保護(hù)主義，

5、這些保護(hù)主義的目的是為了減少有關(guān)環(huán)境的法規(guī)。與此同時(shí)，北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定引發(fā)了一些學(xué)者的擔(dān)憂，那就是美國(guó)污染密集型跨國(guó)公司將搬遷到墨西哥。搬遷的原因是墨西哥的環(huán)保法規(guī)沒(méi)那么嚴(yán)格，這就是所謂的污染避難所假說(shuō)。</p><p>　　在過(guò)去的15至20年間，全球外商直接投資特別是對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家的投資大幅度增加。1995年，發(fā)展中國(guó)家收到的世界各地的外國(guó)直接投資是900億美元（占全球總量的38％）（世界銀行，1996），其中

6、大部分投資到亞洲（包括中國(guó)）和拉丁美洲（貿(mào)發(fā)會(huì)議，1995）。這種趨勢(shì)鼓勵(lì)很多學(xué)者研究外國(guó)直接投資流動(dòng)的結(jié)構(gòu)性因素（例如，F(xiàn)root,1993）和外國(guó)直接投資與生產(chǎn)率溢出之間的關(guān)系（例如，Aitken et al.，1996；Aitken 和 Harrison，1999； Görg 和 Strobl， 2001）。工業(yè)化國(guó)家與發(fā)展中國(guó)家的外商直接投資和嚴(yán)格的環(huán)境法規(guī)之間的關(guān)系受到的關(guān)注相對(duì)較少，對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題的研究正是本文所做出的

7、貢獻(xiàn)。</p><p>　　大多數(shù)研究外國(guó)直接投資與環(huán)境的關(guān)系的論文沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)行業(yè)減排成本和發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家對(duì)外直接投資流量之間的聯(lián)系（例如，Dean，1992；Zarsky，1999；Fabry and Zenghi，2000；Eskeland和 Harrison，2003)。事實(shí)上Repetto（1995）認(rèn)為，美國(guó)流向發(fā)展中國(guó)家的外國(guó)投資中，只有5％到污染嚴(yán)重的部門（美國(guó)24％的投資是流向發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的）。最近研究美國(guó)外

8、商對(duì)內(nèi)直接投資的有關(guān)文獻(xiàn)成功地發(fā)現(xiàn)了污染避難所假說(shuō)（例如，List et al.，2001； Fredriksson et al.，2003；Keller 和 Levinson，2002) 。</p><p>　　關(guān)注貿(mào)易流動(dòng)的污染避難說(shuō)文獻(xiàn)也發(fā)現(xiàn)了支持污染避難所假說(shuō)的證據(jù)。比起尋求支持污染避難所說(shuō)的證據(jù)，更具針對(duì)性的研究問(wèn)題是為什么我們不能找到更多的證據(jù)，這個(gè)事實(shí)使得污染避難所假說(shuō)具備直觀的吸引力。在本文中，作

9、者認(rèn)為，一個(gè)導(dǎo)致污染避難所證據(jù)不足的原因被大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)忽略了，那就是他們沒(méi)有考慮要素稟賦跨國(guó)公司決定搬遷或設(shè)立外國(guó)工廠時(shí)所起的作用。人們常常認(rèn)為，和貿(mào)易流動(dòng)一樣，外國(guó)投資流入至少有部分時(shí)被要素稟賦所驅(qū)動(dòng)，尤其是那些由北向南流動(dòng)的投資（例如，Caves，1982；Helpman，1984； Markusen， 1984）。如果是這樣，那么我們可以預(yù)測(cè)，資本密集型公司將投資于資本雄厚的國(guó)家，而勞動(dòng)密集型企業(yè)則會(huì)投資于勞力密集的國(guó)家。然而，資本

10、密集型行業(yè)通常也是污染密集型行業(yè)，但資本雄厚的國(guó)家通常擁有最高的環(huán)保法規(guī)。因此，這種“資本勞動(dòng)假說(shuō)”似乎是反對(duì)污染避難所假說(shuō)的。“資本勞動(dòng)假說(shuō)”證明資本充足的北方國(guó)家將專注于資本（和污染）密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)的生產(chǎn)，而勞動(dòng)力豐富的南方國(guó)家會(huì)反其道而行之。與此相反，污染避難所假說(shuō)證明擁有較低環(huán)境法規(guī)的南方國(guó)家將專注于污染（和資本）密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)的生產(chǎn)，而北方國(guó)家則正好相反</p><p>　　考慮到上述論點(diǎn)，本文所作的貢獻(xiàn)如下。

11、首先，我們證明了美國(guó)工業(yè)的資本密集度和污染強(qiáng)度的關(guān)系，也是一個(gè)國(guó)家資本充足度和環(huán)保法規(guī)的嚴(yán)格度之間的關(guān)系。這些結(jié)論可以讓我們找出哪些國(guó)家最有可能成為污染的避風(fēng)港。第二，根據(jù)我們的推理，墨西哥和巴西是確實(shí)有可能成為污染避難地?？紤]到這一信息，我們對(duì)這兩個(gè)國(guó)家多個(gè)領(lǐng)域?qū)ν庵苯油顿Y的決定因素進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的計(jì)量分析。對(duì)于為何有關(guān)污染避難所的證據(jù)如此有限，我們提供了重要的見(jiàn)解。 </p><p>　　本文的其余安排如下。第二

12、章提供了分析外商直接投資流量的包括理論和實(shí)證方面的文獻(xiàn)綜述。第三章研究了資本、污染排放強(qiáng)度和環(huán)境法規(guī)之間的聯(lián)系。第四章的內(nèi)容為計(jì)量分析。第五章是結(jié)論。</p><p><b>　　文獻(xiàn)回顧</b></p><p>　　本章提供了與外國(guó)直接投資有關(guān)一些問(wèn)題的理論和實(shí)證的簡(jiǎn)要概述。在總體上，外商直接投資對(duì)于東道國(guó)和投資國(guó)都存在潛在效益。例如，東道國(guó)可以得到財(cái)政資源、新技術(shù)

13、和管理技能、就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)和技能升級(jí)的工作隊(duì)伍。在另一方面，投資國(guó)可獲的高于要素成本的利潤(rùn)，以及尋求廉價(jià)勞動(dòng)力（資歷）、可靠的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、技術(shù)能力、高效的市場(chǎng)體系內(nèi)的本地需求、穩(wěn)定的政治和體制化的法律環(huán)境（Van den Bulcke和Zhang，1998）。</p><p>　　近期的外商直接投資的文獻(xiàn)嘗試研究外商直接投資的模式，內(nèi)容包含產(chǎn)業(yè)組織，跨國(guó)公司和定位理論。流入發(fā)展中國(guó)家的外商直接投資的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)方式是基于內(nèi)生增長(zhǎng)

14、理論的，因?yàn)樵诎l(fā)展中國(guó)家，外商直接投資可增加資本存量和技術(shù)訣竅，從而提高東道國(guó)收入和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率，最終導(dǎo)致更高的GDP和稅收收入。外商直接投資的外部性通常可以通過(guò)模仿加強(qiáng)的柯布一道格拉斯生產(chǎn)函數(shù)（以對(duì)數(shù)和時(shí)間導(dǎo)數(shù)得出一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的增長(zhǎng)核算方程）得到。如果跨國(guó)公司得到大量的利潤(rùn)和股息或者跨國(guó)公司取得東道國(guó)的稅收或其他方面的優(yōu)惠而排擠了國(guó)內(nèi)投資，那么外商直接投資的外部性的是負(fù)面的。</p><p>　　要素比例理論（Hec

15、kscher–Ohlin）指明貿(mào)易模式也可用來(lái)解釋發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家的之間的投資模式?；诖怪睌U(kuò)展的動(dòng)機(jī)，企業(yè)在其他條件不變的基礎(chǔ)上，會(huì)被要素價(jià)格比母國(guó)便宜的國(guó)家吸引，特別是該企業(yè)密集使用的要素較便宜時(shí)（Markusen，1984；Helpman，1984； Helpman and Krugman，1985；Ethier and Horn，1990）。因此，跨國(guó)公司會(huì)在要素比例差異較大的國(guó)家之間進(jìn)行單一方向的投資活動(dòng)。Brainard

16、和其他人指出，雖然要素比例論在解釋發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家外商直接投資流量時(shí)相對(duì)成功，但是無(wú)法解釋具有相同資本和勞動(dòng)力稟賦的國(guó)家之間的投資比例（在研究有相同要素稟賦的國(guó)家之間的貿(mào)易格局時(shí)，也發(fā)現(xiàn)相同的結(jié)果）。有一種替代方法叫近距離濃度框架，就是在接近客戶和專業(yè)供應(yīng)商時(shí)以規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)為代價(jià)產(chǎn)生橫向擴(kuò)張吸引力（例如，Horstmann和Markusen，1992；Brainard，1992）。</p><p>　　然而，本文

17、關(guān)注的是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家與發(fā)展中國(guó)家因環(huán)境法規(guī)和資本強(qiáng)度的不同而產(chǎn)生的部門差異的影響。在這種情況下，不同部門會(huì)有不同的資本要求，因此美國(guó)一個(gè)部門的對(duì)外直接投資（除其他事項(xiàng)外）由該部門的資本要求而定。這反過(guò)來(lái)，均與一個(gè)部門的污染強(qiáng)度相關(guān)，這將會(huì)在后面討論到。但我們必須小心我們對(duì)資本需求的解釋。從某種意義上說(shuō)，資本包括基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、機(jī)器的可用性、零配件、建筑和電信等元素。雖然跨國(guó)公司可以根據(jù)自有資金和技術(shù)來(lái)轉(zhuǎn)移資本，但是某些行業(yè)在選擇投資地點(diǎn)時(shí)還需要考

18、慮發(fā)展水平和資本復(fù)雜程度。</p><p>　　可以說(shuō)，從理論上研究資本密集度和環(huán)境法規(guī)對(duì)外商直接投資的影響的學(xué)者就只有Eskeland和Harrison（2003）。他們用一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的模型說(shuō)明了加強(qiáng)環(huán)境法規(guī)對(duì)外商直接投資的影響是模糊的。這種含糊性源于資本與污染治理之間的互補(bǔ)性。對(duì)于以利潤(rùn)最大化為目標(biāo)的公司，更加嚴(yán)格的環(huán)保法規(guī)有可能導(dǎo)致增加或減少對(duì)東道國(guó)（發(fā)展中國(guó)家）和母國(guó)（發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家）的投資。他們的簡(jiǎn)單模型的參數(shù)決

19、定了：（1）特定部門的企業(yè)是繼續(xù)待在母國(guó)，保留舊技術(shù)并支付減量成本。（2）還是轉(zhuǎn)移地點(diǎn)，保留舊技術(shù)并支付減量成本并關(guān)閉現(xiàn)有廠房）。（3）或者繼續(xù)待在母國(guó)，投資清潔技術(shù)并支付較低的減排成本。</p><p>　　本文中，作者建議，由于污染密集產(chǎn)業(yè)的資本密集度相對(duì)較強(qiáng)，企業(yè)可以有一個(gè)優(yōu)先在國(guó)內(nèi)投資。相對(duì)于母國(guó)的資本成本，發(fā)展中國(guó)家的物質(zhì)資本（由于成本的作用）較稀缺，這使得因嚴(yán)格度較低的環(huán)境法規(guī)而產(chǎn)生的利益得不償失。這

20、一特性使得這些行業(yè)不適合從發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家向發(fā)展中國(guó)家搬遷。因此，會(huì)導(dǎo)致發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的企業(yè)傾向于在國(guó)內(nèi)投資而不是在國(guó)外，這可能就是限制污染避難所假說(shuō)實(shí)證研究的證據(jù)數(shù)量的部分原因。因此，我們利用重力方程法（基于一個(gè)和Eskeland與Harrison的理論框架一致的估計(jì)方程）來(lái)研究部門之間的對(duì)外直接投資和減排成本的關(guān)系。同時(shí)，我們控制了其他相關(guān)變量，如資本勞動(dòng)比例，市場(chǎng)規(guī)模，運(yùn)輸成本，工資差別，熟練勞動(dòng)力和貿(mào)易開(kāi)放等，這些變量在研究外商直接投資的實(shí)證

21、論文中是非常常見(jiàn)的（例如，Brainard的最新研究，1997；Braconier和Ekholm，2000；Carr et al.， 2001；Eskeland和Harrison，2003）。</p><p><b>　　實(shí)證思考</b></p><p><b>　　美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)的特征</b></p><p>　　為了說(shuō)明污染

22、避難所假說(shuō)和勞動(dòng)資本假說(shuō)的截然不同的觀點(diǎn)，我們考察了美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)的污染強(qiáng)度和資本密集度。我們采用美國(guó)人口普查局截止至1994年的有關(guān)美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)污染治理成本的數(shù)據(jù)。表1可以用來(lái)衡量一個(gè)1989至1994年期間的美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)污染治理成本平均水平。此外，把污染治理成本看作是附加值所占百分比和人均物質(zhì)資本強(qiáng)度，該表提供了兩位數(shù)字的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)業(yè)分類的行業(yè)排名。我們把人均物質(zhì)資本強(qiáng)度定義為非工資價(jià)值，在1990年每個(gè)工人大概占1000美元左右。把污染治理成本當(dāng)作

23、是股份價(jià)值增加的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，其中最高的是一下四個(gè)行業(yè)：標(biāo)準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)業(yè)分類29（石油），標(biāo)準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)業(yè)分類33（基本金屬），標(biāo)準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)業(yè)分類26（紙）和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)業(yè)分類28（化工行業(yè)）。Hettigeet al.（1994）也發(fā)現(xiàn)上述四種行業(yè)對(duì)空氣和水的污染最高。</p><p>　　現(xiàn)有的污染避難所學(xué)說(shuō)忽視了一個(gè)重要因素，那就是具有較高污染減排成本的行業(yè)都有一個(gè)共同的特點(diǎn)。那就是這些行業(yè)的資金密集度高于那些清潔、污染少的行業(yè)。資本密集的生

24、產(chǎn)工序每單位產(chǎn)出排放的污染超過(guò)勞工密集的工序所排放的。我們從多個(gè)方面來(lái)證實(shí)這一點(diǎn)。首先,表1根據(jù)人均物質(zhì)資本強(qiáng)度對(duì)個(gè)部門進(jìn)行了排名（作為1989年至1994年的平均水平）。污染治理成本和人均物質(zhì)資本強(qiáng)度之間的關(guān)系是明確的，污染治理成本最高的五個(gè)部門，正好也是人均物質(zhì)資本強(qiáng)度最高的部門。據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)，排名為兩位數(shù)的企業(yè)和三位數(shù)的企業(yè)的相關(guān)系數(shù)分別為0.69（t統(tǒng)計(jì)值4.1）和0.53（t 統(tǒng)計(jì)值6.8）。我們還認(rèn)為,從人均來(lái)說(shuō)，污染治理成本和人

25、均物質(zhì)資本強(qiáng)度之間的相關(guān)系數(shù)為0.67（t 統(tǒng)計(jì)值9.6）。根據(jù)污染治理成本，人均物質(zhì)資本強(qiáng)度在美國(guó)工業(yè)中的分布如圖1所示。</p><p>　　FDI and the Capital Intensity of “Dirty” Sectors: A Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven Puzzle</p><p>　　Matthew A. Cole a

26、nd Robert J. R. Elliott*</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　In an increasingly integrated world, falling trade barriers mean that the role environ- mental regulations play in shaping a country’s com

27、parative advantage is greater than ever. If international competitiveness is influenced by differences in regulations, then changing trade patterns or the relocation of firms (foreign direct investment) may result in pro

28、tectionist arguments for lower environmental regulations.1 At the same time, in the US, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has re</p><p>　　In the last 15 to 20 years, global FDI flows, and speci

29、fically those to developing coun- tries, have increased considerably. In 1995 developing countries received US$90 billion (38%) of world wide FDI (World Bank, 1996), with the majority going to Asia (includ- ing China) an

30、d Latin America (UNCTAD, 1995). Such trends have encouraged a large literature examining the structural determinants of FDI flows (see, for example, Froot, 1993) and the relationship between FDI and productivity spillove

31、rs (s</p><p>　　Of the papers that have examined the relationship between FDI and the environ- ment, the majority generally find no firm link between industry abatement costs and</p><p>　　develop

32、ed country outbound FDI flows (see, for example, Dean, 1992; Zarsky, 1999; Fabry and Zenghi, 2000; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003). Indeed Repetto (1995) con- cludes that of the US foreign investment that went to developing

33、 countries, only 5% went to pollution-intensive sectors (compared to 24% of US investment to developed countries). Recent evidence that only examines US inward FDI has, however, had more success in finding a PHH effect (

34、see, for example, List et al., 2001; Fredriksson et a</p><p>　　The wider pollution haven literature that often focuses on trade flows, has also only found weak or mixed evidence for the PHH. Given the PHH’s

35、anecdotal and intuitive appeal, rather than trying to seek evidence for pollution havens, the more pertinent research question is to assess why we do not find more evidence.4 In this paper, the authors suggest that one r

36、eason for the lack of pollution haven evidence, largely ignored within the literature, is the role of factor-endowments in the decision </p><p>　　With these arguments in mind, the contribution of this paper

37、is as follows. First, we demonstrate the relationship between the capital intensity and the pollution intensity of US industries, and also the link between the capital abundance of a country and the stringency of its env

38、ironmental regulations. These empirical insights allow us to iden- tify those countries that are most likely to become pollution havens. Second, with this information in mind, we undertake a detailed econometric analysi&

39、lt;/p><p>　　This remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the previous theoretical and empirical literature on FDI flows. Section 3 then exam- ines the linkages between

40、capital, pollution intensity and environmental regulations, whilst section 4 provides the econometric analysis. Section 5 concludes.</p><p>　　Literature Review</p><p>　　This section provides a b

41、rief overview of some of the relevant theoretical and empir- ical issues relating to FDI. At a general level, FDI has potential benefits to both host and donor countries. The host may receive, for example, financial reso

42、urces, new tech- nology and management skills, employment and a skill-upgraded work force. The donor country on the other hand receives benefits over and above those associated with factor costs, and looks for a combinat

43、ion of cheap labor (with qualificat</p><p>　　reliable infrastructures, technological capabilities, local demand within an efficient market system and the stability of a range of political, institutional and

44、legal environ- ments (Van den Bulcke and Zhang, 1998).</p><p>　　The more recent FDI literature attempts to provide models of FDI that contain ele- ments of industrial organization, the theory of multinationa

45、ls and location theory.6 The standard approach to FDI inflows to developing countries is based on endogenous growth theory where FDI increases the capital stock and technological know how, which in turn raises income and

46、 labor productivity in the host country, which eventu- ally results in higher GDP and tax revenues. The externality, usually modeled via </p><p>　　Trade theories based on factor proportions (Heckscher–Ohlin)

47、 that predict the pattern of trade have also been used to explain foreign investment patterns between the North and the South, based on vertical expansion motives so that ceteris paribus firms are attracted to locations

48、where factors that they use intensively are cheaper than at home (see, for example, Markusen, 1984; Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Ethier and Horn, 1990). Multinational activities should only arise, therefore,

49、</p><p>　　This paper, however, is concerned with the effect of sectoral differences in environ- mental regulations and capital intensities between developed and developing countries. In this case, sectors di

50、ffer in their capital requirements and hence the degree of outbound US FDI in a sector will be dependent on, among other things, a sector’s capital requirements (which, in turn, are correlated with the level of pollution

51、 inten- sity in a sector, shown later). We must, however, be careful with our inter</p><p>　　Arguably, the only study to theoretically model the effect of capital intensity and environmental regulations on o

52、utbound FDI is Eskeland and Harrison (2003). Using a simple model, they demonstrate that the effect on outward FDI of an increase in environmental regulations may be ambiguous. This ambiguity arises from the possible com

53、plementarity between capital and pollution abatement, where more stringent environmental regulations could lead to an increase or decrease in investment by profit max</p><p>　　The parameters of their simple

54、model determine whether: (i) a firm in a given sector stays at home, keeps the old technology and pays the abatements costs; (ii) moves</p><p>　　location and keeps the old technology and pays lower abatement

55、 costs (and shuts the existing plant); or (iii) remains at home and invests in cleaner technology and pays lower abatement costs.</p><p>　　In this paper, the authors propose that a firm may have a preference

56、 to invest at home due to the relative capital intensity of pollution intensive industries. This feature makes these industries ill-suited for relocation from developed to developing coun- tries since the scarcity (and h

57、ence cost) of physical capital in developing countries relative to the cost of capital at home, may outweigh any benefit from lower environmental regulations (the KLH). This may, therefore, reinforce a developed </p&g

58、t;<p>　　Empirical Considerations</p><p>　　The Characteristics of US Industries</p><p>　　In order to illustrate the opposing forces of the PHH and the KLH, we examine the pollution intensi

59、ty and the capital intensity of US industries. We employ data derived from the US Bureau of the Census that reports the pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC) of US industry up to 1994. Measured as an average for the

60、 period 1989–94, Table 1 provides a ranking of two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries, in terms of PAOC as a percentage of value added and physical capital in</p><p>　　Observe that PAO

61、C as a share of value added is the highest for SIC 29 (Petroleum), SIC 33 (Primary Metals), SIC 26 (Paper), and SIC 28 (Chemicals industries). Hettige et al. (1994) also find these four industries to have some of the hig

62、hest air and water pollution intensities.</p><p>　　A factor largely overlooked in the existing pollution haven literature, however, is that the sectors facing the greatest pollution abatement costs share a c

63、ommon feature. They are typically more capital intensive than cleaner, less pollution intensive sectors. Capital-intensive production processes appear to generate more pollution per unit of output than labor-intensive pr

64、ocesses. We substantiate this assertion in a number of ways. First, Table 1 provides a ranking of each two-digit sector in t</p><p>　　Table 1. US Industries Ranked by Pollution Abatement Costs and Physical

65、Capital Intensity (Average 1989–94)</p><p>　　a Thousand 1990 US dollars.</p><p><b>　　5</b></p><p><b>　　4.5</b></p><p><b>　　4</b><

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