1、<p>　　2900單詞，16500英文字符，5200漢字</p><p>　　出處：Roesch B J. Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine[J]. Suffolk UL Rev., 2005, 39: 379-386.</p><p>&

2、lt;b>　　外文文獻原稿</b></p><p>　　Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine</p><p>　　Roesch B J</p><p>　　I. Introduction</p>&l

3、t;p>　　The judicial branch of the federal government has historically had an uneasy relationship with public opinion. Like the executive and legislative branches, the judiciary depends on public support for its legitim

4、acy. But unlike the political branches, the judiciary is not electorally accountable to those whose support it requires. To the contrary, one of its defining attributes is the duty to thwart political expressions of popu

5、lar will that run afoul of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it has bee</p><p>　　Traditionally, scholarly and judicial commentary on the influence of public opinion on the federal judiciary has followed two co

6、urses. Some commentators and jurists argue that judicial independence requires that public opinion have no influence on judicial decision-making. Another group of scholars advocates an indirectly influential role for pub

7、lic opinion in limited contexts. These scholars believe judges should refer to "objective" measures of public opinion as guidelines when deciding questi</p><p>　　Recent developments in empirical re

8、search suggest that these positions take too limited a view of public opinion as an influence on judicial decision- making. The research suggests that the "judicial isolation" model conflicts with reality-the i

9、nfluence of public opinion may be inevitable. This Article will examine this evidence, which suggests that many judges are influenced-at least marginally - by public opinion. Because the judiciary is the one branch of th

10、e federal government committed to a</p><p>　　One might expect public opinion to exert its influence through the judiciary's interaction with the political branches into which democracy channels it, and i

11、t is to these interactions that this Article turns first in its inquiry into the mechanics of public opinion's apparent influence on judicial outcomes. But political controls, such as Congressional control over juris

12、diction and budget, are blunt instruments. The political costs of threatening reprisal through these means for individual deci</p><p>　　Presidential refusal to execute the judiciary's rulings is a more p

13、recise-but rarely invoked-constraint. Formal political constraints ultimately fail to explain public opinion's influence on individual cases.</p><p>　　The Article next turns to more informal influences o

14、n judicial decisions. These constraints include the role of stare decisis and the appellate process, as well as concerns about the jurist's individual reputation and that of the judiciary as a whole. Public opinion m

15、ay reinforce several of these constraints, but seems to have most of its influence where these constraints leave jurists with discretion. Public opinion thus appears to operate in much the same sphere as the judge's

16、own political id</p><p>　　Because consideration of both formal and informal constraints and attitudinal models of decision-making yields unsatisfying answers, the Article turns from influences external to th

17、e judicial decision-making framework and examines the framework itself. In an attempt to understand the apparent influence of public opinion, this Article imagines what a principled incorporation of public opinion into t

18、he various analyses might look like. That is, the Article speculates what American jurisprudence wo</p><p>　　The Supreme Court's citation of opinion polls in Atkins v. Virginia n4 suggests that polls may

19、 be useful evidence of public opinion if public opinion had a legitimate place in legal analysis. The use of opinion polls as evidence of public opinion would expand the universe of issues about which there may be judici

20、ally knowable public opinion, and represent a significant step towards the potential principled incorporation of public opinion into judicial decision-making. Although the court's use of</p><p>　　The tra

21、ditional "spectrum of deference" n5 suggests it is possible to make a reasoned evaluation of the appropriateness of public opinion as an influence in various judicial contexts. The spectrum is based on a realis

22、tic evaluation of the relative institutional advantages of the judiciary and Congress, and affords Congress varying degrees of deference depending on the various functions implicated by the decision-making context. Altho

23、ugh the considerations are not identical when the question is t</p><p>　　For example, Professor Eskridge has argued that public values ought to and do influence the process of statutory interpretation. n6 At

24、kins suggests that public opinion, which may amount to something less than Eskridge's public values, might influence statutory interpretation depending on the strength of the preference and the strength of other trad

25、itional indicators of statutory meaning.</p><p>　　Federal common law is another potential context for the consideration of public opinion. Although the common law does not always directly reflect public pref

26、erences, democratic principles suggest that public opinion could be relevant to determining common law rules. The common law context illuminates several instances where public opinion should not be considered-in most cas

27、es where the rule may affect the public's tax burden, or where public opinion is adverse to a minority or individual who do</p><p>　　Public opinion could also theoretically play a role in constitutional

28、adjudication. Perhaps ironically, determining whether legislation is within Congress's power under the Interstate Commerce Clause - in which the Court grants Congress substantial deference - proves to be an inappropr

29、iate doctrine for incorporating public opinion. The reason is twofold. First, there is no reason to believe that the public has any inherent advantage over the judiciary in determining whether an activity substanti</p

30、><p>　　The vindication of national opinion over a majority in a smaller constituency may justify consideration of public opinion in the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Doctrinal developments in

31、Lawrence v. Texas suggest that public opinion could become a legitimate and explicit consideration in the substantive due process arena. In the course of striking down Texas's law against homosexual sodomy only seve

32、nteen years after upholding the states' ability to prohibit such conduct in Bowers v.</p><p>　　The examination of how public opinion might fit into various judicial doctrines suggests where and how publi

33、c opinion may influence outcomes. In most instances, the correlation of public opinion and judicial outcomes is the result of the process by which judges routinely make decisions rather than an influence external to the

34、decision-making process. This influence therefore need not be viewed as a threat to judicial independence. Current doctrine is, across the board, well designed to reflect p</p><p>　　This Article proceeds as

35、follows: Part II identifies several instances where there is agreement that public opinion must not play a role in judicial decision-making, and examines the competing judicial traditions regarding the role of public opi

36、nion in constitutional adjudication. Part III then surveys evidence that public opinion influences judicial decision-making, and concludes that public opinion may have a marginal effect. It next attempts to explain how t

37、his influence operates, but finds b</p><p>　　II. The Debate over Public Opinion in Judicial Decision-making</p><p>　　A．Public Opinion as Anathema to Judicial Independence</p><p>　　T

38、here is widespread agreement that in certain cases, public opinion should not play any role in a judge's decision. For example, determinations of whether probable cause exists to try a defendant should not be influen

39、ced by public outcry that the defendant is guilty. n9 Nor should public animus influence individual sentencing decisions. n10 A recent example of these dangers is illuminating.</p><p>　　In 1995, Federal Dist

40、rict Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York presided over a high profile drug prosecution. After a hearing where Judge Baer found the testimony of defense witnesses credible and the testimony of police officers

41、"incredible," he excluded large quantities of drugs and a confession, ruling that they were obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.</p><p>　　The public and p

42、olitical responses were immediate. The New York Times ran several editorials condemning the ruling. Members of Congress spoke publicly about impeachment, and some even asked President Clinton to add his voice to the crit

43、icism. In the meantime, Judge Baer granted a rehearing on the suppression motion. President Clinton declined to comment on the case pending the results of the rehearing. According to the New York Times, a group of Circu

44、it Court judges, and several commentators, t</p><p>　　After rehearing the motion, Judge Baer reversed his original decision and admitted the evidence, citing newly-introduced police reports as additional evi

45、dence that compelled him to change his mind. But critics claim that this additional evidence could not have been a sufficient ground for reversal, and may have even hurt the prosecution's case by creating additional

46、inconsistencies with the officers' testimony. Judge Baer was in a no-win situation. There was negative publicity about his original</p><p>　　The late Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote about the effects of pu

47、blic opinion on the judicial decision-making process, concluding that "no judge can conscientiously say in so many words, "I gave you my best judgment when I decided that the Constitution meant thus and so, but

48、 since the public overwhelmingly disagrees with my interpretation of the Constitution, I will therefore change my mind." On its face, this statement appears to reject public opinion as a consideration in constitutio

49、nal adjudicat</p><p>　　In these contexts, capitulation to contrary public opinion would signal the end of judicial independence. But a careful consideration of public opinion in certain cases does not necess

50、arily indicate an erosion of judicial independence. Commentators and jurists have long acknowledged the influence of public opinion without concluding that the judiciary has abdicated its responsibility of independent ju

51、dgment.</p><p>　　B. Competing Judicial Views on the Propriety on Considering Public Opinion</p><p>　　Commentators and jurists have long recognized the effect of public opinion on the judiciary i

52、n circumstances where it is not a threat to judicial independence. The Chief Justice Rehnquist, drawing on his experience as a law clerk to Justice Jackson, concluded that public opinion had a significant influence on th

53、e Court's disposition in the "Steel Seizure" case. In 1952, President Truman, fearing that a reduction in steel production would hinder the Korean War effort, ordered federal officials to</p><p&g

54、t;　　The timing of the government's "inherent power" argument was not good, as support for both the Korean War and President Truman was at its nadir. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the tides of publi

55、c opinion, accelerated and intensified by the rapid movement of the case through the federal judicial system, influenced the Court's decision. </p><p>　　Acknowledging public opinion's influence and i

56、ncorporating it into doctrine are separate propositions, however. Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly dissented from opinions taking public opinion into account, stating that public opinion was constitutionally irrelevant

57、. Justice Scalia agreed with Rehnquist's theory, commenting on "how upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens...think that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as though we were engaged

58、 not in ascertaining an</p><p>　　Chief Justice Rehnquist also drew considerable support for his position from a longstanding belief among the public that judges do not-and must not-consider public opinion in

59、 making decisions. Moreover, many jurists share this view of the judiciary and of their own work. Justice Douglas described judges as strong amid the winds of political change. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "legis

60、latures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." </p><p>　　Support for public opinion as a factor in judicial decision-making among U.S. Cou

61、rt of Appeals judges is mixed. Of thirty-five judges surveyed in 1981, only one responded that public opinion was "a very important" factor, while eight said that it was "moderately important" and twe

62、nty-two said that it was "not important." Judge Tacha of the Tenth Circuit declared that public opinion should have no influence whatsoever in articulating ideal judicial procedure.</p><p>　　Justic

63、e Story wrote that "it is not for judges to listen to ... popular appeal." Chief Justice Taney also addressed the role of public opinion in Dred Scot v. Sanford, concluding that current public opinion was irrel

64、evant to constitutional interpretation. Strictly denying the influence of public opinion is problematic in several respects, however. First, it does not appear to reflect reality. Evidence discussed below suggests that p

65、ublic opinion influences judicial decision-making, even if only </p><p>　　There is also a tradition of recognizing public opinion in certain constitutional contexts. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pen

66、nsylvania v. Casey, Justice Souter cited divided public opinion as a reason to uphold the central holding in Roe v. Wade. According to Justice Souter, the Court should refrain from reversing its watershed cases until sub

67、stantial public opinion for the decision becomes unfavorable. </p><p>　　Justice Souter's incorporation of public opinion into constitutional doctrine is also firmly grounded in judicial tradition. In 181

68、2, the Court held in United States v. Hudson n43 that the federal courts lacked the power to make criminal common law. In the decision, Justice Johnson stated that although this question is brought up now for the first t

69、ime to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has this jurisdi</p><p><b>　　外文文獻翻譯稿</b></p><p>　

70、　群體控制：多數主義法院與公共輿論的反思</p><p>　　作者：本杰明·J·羅斯切</p><p><b>　　一、序言</b></p><p>　　聯(lián)邦國家機關的司法部門有史以來就與社會輿論有著令人不安的緊張關系。如同行政和立法部門，司法部門也有賴于從大眾的支持中獲得合法地位。但不同于政治部門的是司法部門并非通過被選舉

71、的方式來對支持他們的人負責。相反，它的固有職責之一就是阻止那些違憲的群眾性的政治表達。然而，根據一些法學學者的說法，有人指出普通法系的上訴法院法官的觀點有必要建立在社會對法外價值的共識上。換句話說，那些常常反對多數主義的法官也必須做出社會大眾在長期內能接受的判決以維持其合法地位。凱姆林斯基教授提出假說：“司法的合理性取決于其判決的社會接受度和得出這個判決的程序的合法性?！?lt;/p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)上認為，學者和法

72、官在輿論對聯(lián)邦司法部門的影響上的分析主要走兩個路徑——一些評論家和法學家認為司法獨立要求輿論對司法判決的作出不應當產生任何影響，另一群學者則提倡輿論在例外情形下可以對司法判決的作出產生間接的影響。這些學者認為法官應該在某些情況下尋求公眾輿論作為“客觀”的指引，比如在作出法律解釋時，在界定什么是第八修正案禁止的“殘酷的非正常的待遇”時。</p><p>　　根據最近一些實證研究的發(fā)現表明，上述觀點過于限制輿論對司法

73、判決產生的影響。這項研究表明“司法中立”模式可能與現實相悖，社會輿論的影響不可避免。本文將考察這一認為法官或多或少都會受到輿論影響的論據。因為司法部門也是聯(lián)邦機關的一個分支，所以也要付諸于透明的決策制定過程，本文將分析社會輿論在各種情形下如何影響司法判決的制定過程。輿論對司法的這一明顯影響機制將會顯著影響我們如何設想輿論和司法判決之間的關系以及這種影響是否構成對司法獨立的威脅。</p><p>　　有人可能認為民

74、主制度會引導輿論通過司法和政治部門的互動來發(fā)揮它的影響，并且正是關注這種互動的本文首次開始調研輿論對司法判決影響的機制。但政治控制，例如國會對司法管轄權和財政的控制就是一把鈍器。通過上述方式對法官的個人決策進行報復所產生的政治成本促使他們以“認定無效”作為一種手段，逐案地影響司法的基礎?？偨y(tǒng)拒絕執(zhí)行司法機關的判決是一個更準確說明對司法機關制約的例子，雖然總統(tǒng)很少這么做。官方正式的政治制約最終未能解釋輿論對個案的影響。</p>

75、<p>　　本文于是轉而更多地討論那些以非正式的方式對司法判決產生的影響。這些產生影響的制約力量包括尊重先例原則、上訴的程序以及對法學家的個人威望和對司法整體的關注。輿論可能會加強上述幾方面的約束力，但似乎在這些制約因素允許法學家自由裁量的時候其影響力是最為強大的。輿論于是在類似于法官個人政治理念的領域里發(fā)揮作用，而在這一領域中，根據司法決策的“態(tài)度”模式，法官可以在先例約束原則的范圍內擴大自由裁量的空間。</p&g

76、t;<p>　　由于對正式和非正式約束力量以及司法決策中的“態(tài)度”模式的考量會得出不能令人滿意的答案，本文于是從外部影響轉而討論司法決策的內部框架并審查這個框架本身。為了更進一步理解輿論的顯著作用，本文進而設想有原則地融入社會輿論后的各種分析會是什么樣子。也就是說，本文首先以一個特別的判例為開頭——該案中法官視民意調查為司法決策的合法部分——推演出當社會輿論作為一種切實的而不是神秘莫測的影響力量來影響司法判決的作出時，美國

77、的判例法體系將會怎樣。這種想法的實驗最終得出另一種對司法結果和輿論之間關系的解釋。</p><p>　　最高法院在阿特金斯訴弗吉尼亞州的案件中引用民意調查的事例表明如果輿論在法律推理中有合法地位的話，民意測驗將會是一項非常有用的證據。將民意調查作為證據使用的這一案例擴大了通過司法程序獲知民意這一問題的研究領域，同時也代表著我們向著將民意有原則地融入司法決策的潛在可能邁出了極有意義的一步。雖然不幸的是在該案中民意測

78、驗不能在審判中受到專家證人的審查和評論，但是民意測驗依然是一項潛在的反映社會輿論的重要而有力的證據。同時，針對該案中法院使用民意測驗作為證據的評論認為，社會輿論足以精確地測量以支持法官將它作為證據采用。</p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)的“服從頻譜”表明，對在各種司法環(huán)境中產生影響的社會輿論的適當性進行合理評價是完全可能的。這個頻譜基于對相對的體制優(yōu)勢進行現實的評估，并允許國會根據不同決策環(huán)境下的各種職能表現出不同的服從

79、度。雖然當問題集中在社會輿論而不是對政府機構的服從度的情況下時，這個頻譜考慮的因素與之并不完全相同，但是對政府和司法機關基本價值的審查將啟發(fā)司法機關何時以及如何反映輿論。</p><p>　　比方說，艾斯克瑞吉教授就認為社會價值觀應該而且確實影響著法律解釋。阿特金斯提出，輿論的影響力雖然小于艾斯克瑞吉所說的社會價值，但是仍可能影響法律解釋，取決于法官個人偏好的程度以及法定意義上的其他傳統(tǒng)因素的力量。</p&

80、gt;<p>　　美國聯(lián)邦的普通法是另一個對民意進行考量的潛在背景。雖然普通法并非經常直接反映社會的偏好，但是民主原則要求對普通法規(guī)則的制定必須考慮民意。普通法體系的背景表明了在若干情況下不應當考慮輿論，包括影響公共稅收負擔的情況，公共輿論對少數派或者不受憲法權利保護的個體不利的情況。</p><p>　　公共輿論理論上同樣對憲法裁決產生影響。可能有點諷刺的是，決定是否立法在州際貿易條款下屬于國會的

81、權限——在州際貿易條款中法院對國會給予實質上的服從——被證明是不恰當地采納民意的做法。原因是雙重的，首先，沒有理由相信公眾相比于司法機關在確定一項活動是否實質上影響州際貿易上更具有固有的優(yōu)勢。其次，法院的貿易條款僅僅為憲法上適當的決策者作為引進民意的裁定依據，這一點似乎與立法行為要求的民意普遍性毫無關系。然而，社會輿論驚人地適用于其他的憲法原則。</p><p>　　即使是在小選區(qū)里對全國流行的觀點進行的辯駁也可

82、以證明對法院第生死修正案中對社會輿論的考慮是正當合理的。在勞倫斯訴德州案中的學理發(fā)展表明輿論可能在實質正義的領域內成為一個合法的和明確的考慮因素。在反對德克薩斯州禁止同性性行為的過程中，僅僅在支持德州阻止類似行為十七年之后，勞倫斯法院就得出了與第八修正案具有驚人相似性的分析。勞倫斯法院于是指出了在實質正義程序的判例中輿論的學理地位。因為類似的發(fā)展并未出現在法院的平等保護判例中，所以本文保留了關于平等保護學說契合民意的判斷。</p&

83、gt;<p>　　對輿論可能如何契合各種司法原則的審查研究指出了輿論在哪里以及怎樣影響著司法的判決結果。在大多數情況下，輿論的司法判決結果的相關性是體現在法官按照常規(guī)作出決定的過程而不是外部因素直接影響法官作出決定的過程。因此，這種影響不需要被視為對司法獨立的威脅。一刀切地說，目前的原則是為旨在反映民意。</p><p>　　本文將如此展開：第Ⅱ部分首先提出一些不能讓民意干預司法的特定情況并考察具有

84、競爭性的司法傳統(tǒng)在有關于民意影響憲法裁決時發(fā)揮的作用。第Ⅲ部分調查輿論影響司法判決的證據并得出輿論具有邊際效應的結論。接著，本文筆者嘗試著解釋了這種效應如何發(fā)揮作用并發(fā)現了政治性的以及非正式的內部司法控制的不足導致輿論對司法產生的影響。最終，本文考察了對民意測驗的在阿特金斯案中的采用來定義“殘酷而非正常的懲罰”。第Ⅳ部分考察了司法判決這個工具本身來解釋社會輿論對司法判決的明顯影響。在這部分中，本文首先概述了什么是傳統(tǒng)的“服從頻譜”，并將

85、其作為一個例子來分析在形形色色的情形下是否可以在理論上把輿論列為作出司法判決的考量之一。本文接著分析在形形色色的情形下輿論是否可以作為合法的考慮因素，包括在立法解釋、普通法的立法過程以及若干憲法性質的情況下。本文是通過考察各種反映民意的學說傾向和近期判例對社會輿論鏡像反映上述學說的能力的影響而得出最后結論的。</p><p>　　二、討論在司法判決作出過程中的輿論</p><p>　?。ㄒ?/p>

86、）司法獨立絕對禁止輿論干擾的觀點</p><p>　　有一種廣為人知的觀點認為輿論絕對不可以對司法判決的作出產生任何干擾。比如，無論是否存在可能的原因，對被告的定罪過程始終不能受到那些認為其有罪的輿論的影響。同樣也不應該讓輿論的敵意來影響被告的量刑。最近的一個案例正說明了這一點。</p><p>　　1995年，紐約南區(qū)聯(lián)邦地方法院法官貝爾審理了一起有名的對毒品案件的起訴。在經過庭審聽證之

87、后，法官貝爾認為辯方的論證具有可信度而控方的指控沒有可信度，他排除認定大量毒品存在和辯方的認罪，判決被告的第四、五項修正案權利被侵犯。</p><p>　　針對這一判決，民間和官方的反應都非常迅速。紐約時代周刊的幾篇評論都譴責這一判決。國會的議員公開表示要彈劾法官，甚至有些議員要求克林頓總統(tǒng)加入他們的聲討。當此之時，貝爾法官也批準了對該案的重審，克林頓總統(tǒng)則拒絕評論該案以待該案的重審。根據紐約時代，一群巡回法院的

88、法官和若干評論家傳遞給貝爾法官的信息是很明確的：保全你自己或者冒著丟掉工作的風險去堅持己見，盡管僅因為法官對某案件的判決就彈劾其的做法不符合慣例。</p><p>　　在案件重審后，貝爾法官推翻了他原來的判決并附上證據，引用了最新產生的警方報告作為新證據，這份報告顯示法官貝爾曾被威脅要求改變判決結果。但是評論家認為，這一新增的證據并不足以支持其推翻原判決，并且這樣一來由于導致了官方證詞的出爾反爾而可能損害該公訴案

89、件判決的可信度。貝爾法官陷入兩難境地。輿論中有反對貝爾法官排除該證據的聲音，同樣也有反對他改變態(tài)度去采納該證據的聲音，無論哪一種做法都會損害公眾對司法公平的信任。</p><p>　　已故首席大法官倫奎斯特曾這樣描寫輿論對司法決策過程的影響——沒有一個法官能自覺地在眾多觀點的包圍中表達自己?！拔医o你提供最公正的判決并且我覺得憲法就是這樣規(guī)定和表達的，但是由于壓倒性的公眾意見反對我對憲法的解讀，于是我將改變我的觀點

90、。”從表面上看，這句話似乎在反對將社會輿論作為憲法裁決的考慮因素之一，而更多地與論奎斯特的判決保持一致。</p><p>　　在這些情形下，屈服于社會輿論的反對聲音將意味著司法獨立的終結。但是在某些特殊情形下，對社會輿論的謹慎采納將完全不必然意味著對司法獨立的侵蝕。評論家和法學家早就認可了輿論的影響力而沒有總結出這是由于司法機關自己放棄了獨立審判的職責而引起的結果。</p><p>　　（

91、二）關于如何在司法過程中合理考慮民意的觀點</p><p>　　評論家和法學家很早就認識到輿論對司法的影響也可以存在于其對司法獨立不構成威脅的情況下。首席大法官倫奎斯特總結自己作法律秘書時的經驗對杰克遜法官說：“在‘鋼鐵劫持案’中，輿論對法庭的立場有著顯著的影響力?！?952年，杜魯門總統(tǒng)因擔心鋼產量的下降會影響到當時對朝鮮的戰(zhàn)爭，下令聯(lián)邦機關在一場罷工中控制和經營一些鋼鐵生產機構。鋼鐵企業(yè)于是提起訴訟并從法院獲

92、得了禁令，責令總統(tǒng)不得奪取鋼鐵廠。聯(lián)邦政府從法院收到了中止令并直接上訴至最高法院，最高法院同意復審并在九天后聽取了他們的申辯。法院駁回了政府認為他們的扣押是基于憲法第二條賦予總統(tǒng)的一項權力這一說法。</p><p>　　政府提出“固有權利”這一論點的時機并不好，因為當時對朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭和杜魯門總統(tǒng)的支持正處于其最低點。首席大法官倫奎斯特認為，輿論的浪潮會通過司法系統(tǒng)加速并加劇案件的快速變化，影響著法庭的決策。</

93、p><p>　　然而，承認輿論的影響力和把它融匯入判案原則是兩回事。首席大法官倫奎斯特多次反對把輿論列入考慮的做法，認為輿論與憲法不具有相關性。斯卡利亞法官同意倫奎斯特的理論，如此評論道：“多令人苦惱啊，這么多我們的市民們都認為我們法官應該把他們的意見列入考慮，好像我們從事的不是確定某項客觀的法律規(guī)則而是決定某項社會共識?！?lt;/p><p>　　首席大法官倫奎斯特也從一種長期以來的理念中尋求到

94、了對自己立場的支持，這種理念就是法官不會也不應該在作出判決的考慮公眾的意見。</p><p>　　不僅如此，許多法學界也對司法工作和他們自己的工作抱有同樣的看法。法官道格拉斯把法官描述成能在政治變革之風中挺立那般強大。首席大法官貝格如此寫道：“應當是立法機關而不是法院有義務回應民意以及人民的道德價值觀。”法官鮑威爾也同意并表示：“對民意進行評估本質上是一項立法性質的只能而不是司法性質的?！狈ü俜ㄌm克福也曾寫過法院

95、與代表機構不同，因為他們“不是要被設計成一個對民主社會良好的反映系統(tǒng)”。</p><p>　　支持將民意作為判決作出的考慮因素的意見在美國上訴法院法官中是混雜不清的。在1981年對35名法官的調查中，只有1名法官認為民意是一項非常重要的考慮因素，而8名法官認為它比較重要，且有22名法官認為其不重要。第十巡回法院的法官塔克聲稱在立項的司法程序中輿論應當沒有任何的影響力。</p><p>　　

96、法官司道麗寫道：“聽取民意不是法官的工作。”首席大法官泰尼在德萊德·斯科特訴桑福德案中總結輿論的作用說，當下流行的輿論與憲法解釋毫無關系。</p><p>　　但是，嚴格否定輿論的作用在某些情況下是有問題的。首先，這樣做不符合實際。下文討論的證據就表明輿論的確影響司法決策，雖然只是在無意識的層面中。其次，在某些情況下，輿論可以作為政策制定法庭的一項合法的考量因素。</p><p>