1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The Determinants of Capital Structure:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies</p><p>　

2、　One early extension was to allow for the incidence of taxation and ?nancial distress. Since the late 1970s, there have been two new strands of research which originate more from the theory of the ?rm: the ‘pecking order

3、’ theory and the ‘trade-o?’ theory. The pecking order theory argues that ?rms have a preference of issuing ?nancing instruments due to adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory suggests that the ?na

4、ncial manager tends to use internal capital as the ?rst choic</p><p>　　2.1. The pecking order theory</p><p>　　The pecking order theory is based on the information asymmetries between the ?rm’s m

5、anagers and the outside investors. Ross (1977) was the ?rst to address the function of debt as a signalling mechanism when there are information asymmetries between the ?rm’s management and its investors. He argued that

6、management has better knowledge of the ?rm than the investors, and that management will try to avoid debt when the ?rm is performing poorly for fear that any debt default due to poor cash ?ow will</p><p>　　2

7、.2. The trade-off theory</p><p>　　The trade-o? theory argues that there is an optimal capital structure that maximizes the ?rm value, but the trade-o? comes in various forms.</p><p>　　2.2.1. Tax

8、Shield Bene?ts and the Financial Distress Cost of Debt</p><p>　　One of the crucial assumptions of the MM (1958) model was that there is no taxation. Later work by Modigliani and Miller (1963), and Miller (19

9、77) add tax e?ects into the original framework. An implication of this newer work was that ?rms should ?nance their projects completely through debt in order to maximize corporate value. Clearly this contradicts reality

10、in that debt constitutes only a fraction of ?rms’ total capital. Subsequent theoretical work seeks an optimal capital structure which res</p><p>　　One problem with the theories based on consideration of the

11、tax-shield bene?ts is that they cannot explain why capital structures vary across ?rms that are subject to the same taxation rates. Empirical evidence from the United States (Copeland and Weston, 1992) shows that the cap

12、ital structure of corporations did not change much after corporate income tax came into existence. In Australia, where there is no dual income taxation at all, capital structure is roughly the same as in other economies

13、</p><p>　　2.2.2. Agency Theory and Capital Structure</p><p>　　Even if markets are perfect and there is no tax impact, agency theory suggests that the appropriate mix of debt and equity is still

14、an important matter for corporate governance. In general, debt claims provide the holders with a ?xed repayment schedule but little in the way of rights to control the company, as long as the repayment schedule (and some

15、times certain other terms) is met. However, creditors can have a strong in?uence over a company if it gets in ?nancial distress but, even if a compa</p><p>　　Conversely, equity claims – in particular, common

16、 stock – give shareholders the right to vote for Boards of Directors and on other important corporate issues such as major mergers or plans that would dispose of substantial portions of the company’s assets. Shareholders

17、 are also entitled to receive dividends or other distributions whenever the company pays them or, if the company is liquidated, to receive the net assets of the company after paying all debts and any securities, such as

18、preferred s</p><p>　　Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify two potential sources of con?ict. On the one hand, con?icts between debt-holders and equity-holders arise because the debt contract gives equity-holde

19、rs an incentive to invest sub-optimally. More speci?cally the debt contract provides that, if an investment yields large returns well above the face value of the debt, equity-holders will capture most of the gain. If, ho

20、wever, the investment fails, debt-holders bear the consequences because of limited liability. </p><p>　　On the other hand, con?icts between shareholders and managers arise because managers hold less than 100

21、% of the residual claim. Consequently, they do not bear the entire cost of these activities. Managers may thus invest less effort in managing the ?rm’s resources, and may be able to transfer ?rm resources to their own pe

22、rsonal bene?t, for example through ‘empire-building’ or by consuming ‘perquisites’ such as corporate jets, luxurious offices etc.</p><p>　　The manager bears the entire cost of refraining from these activitie

23、s, but captures only a fraction of the gain. As a result, managers overindulge in these pursuits relative to the level that would maximize ?rm value. This ineffciency is reduced the larger is the fraction of the ?rm’s eq

24、uity owned by the manager. Holding constant the manager’s absolute investment in the ?rm, an increase in the debt ratio of the ?rm increases the manager’s share of the equity and mitigates the loss from the con?i</p&g

25、t;<p>　　A number of implications follow from this analysis. First, one wouldexpect bond contracts to include features that attempt to prevent asset substitution, such as interest coverage requirements, prohibition

26、s against investments in new unrelated lines of business, etc. Second, industries in which the opportunities for asset substitution are more limited will have higher debt levels ceteris paribus. Thus, for example, the th

27、eory predicts that regulated public utilities, banks, and ?rms in mature in</p><p>　　2.2.3. Corporate Control</p><p>　　One limitation of agency theory is that it assumes the agency problem can b

28、e mitigated, or eliminated, by a comprehensive contract which postulates all the future contingencies and states the circumstances in which the manager should take what action, as criticised by Hart (1995a, 1995b). But s

29、uch a comprehensive contract would be very costly to design and/or execute(Williamson, 1988). It may well be optimal to leave the contract incomplete, and to assign the equity-holders the residual control </p><

30、;p>　　Two related models share a common concern with con?icts between shareholders and managers, though they differ in the speci?c ways in which the con?icts arise and in the role of debt. Harris and Raviv (1990) postu

31、late that managers always want to continue the ?rm’s current operations, even if liquidation of the ?rm would be the preferred option for investors. But debt can force managers to liquidate ?rms, because default may well

32、 trigger the managers’ job loss. The optimal capital structure is ac</p><p>　　Source: Jian Chen and Roger Strange, 2006.“conomic Change and Restructuring”. Volume 38, January. pp:11-35 </p><p>

33、<b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu)決定因素—以中國(guó)企業(yè)為案例</p><p>　　為應(yīng)對(duì)稅收與財(cái)務(wù)困境的金融壓力，早期理論作了相應(yīng)的擴(kuò)展。自20世紀(jì)70年代后期以來，已經(jīng)有兩個(gè)新股研究來源于更多更好的企業(yè)理論:啄食理論和“平衡”的理論。次序的理論認(rèn)為，公司發(fā)行的偏好于融資工具逆向選擇問題(梅爾斯（1984)。該理論表明,財(cái)務(wù)經(jīng)理往往第一選擇內(nèi)部資

34、本作為使用資金,然后再發(fā)行債務(wù),發(fā)行股票只會(huì)被認(rèn)為是作為在市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下籌集資金最后的手段。相比之下，平衡理論強(qiáng)調(diào)一個(gè)最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)可以達(dá)到的平衡各種負(fù)債和權(quán)益。</p><p><b>　　2.1啄食順序理論</b></p><p>　　次序的理論基礎(chǔ)是公司的管理者和外面的投資者之間的信息不對(duì)稱。羅斯(1977年)是第一個(gè)強(qiáng)調(diào)債務(wù)功能的，總有一個(gè)信息令公司的管理及其投資者

35、機(jī)制之間的信息不對(duì)稱。他主張，管理公司會(huì)更好地了解投資者, 當(dāng)公司表現(xiàn)差，由于糟糕的現(xiàn)金流量，管理因?yàn)閾?dān)心任何債務(wù)違約會(huì)使他們的工作損失會(huì)設(shè)法避免債務(wù)。信息不對(duì)稱也解釋了為什么已有的投資者可能不會(huì)支持新股權(quán)融資，因?yàn)樾峦顿Y者可以要求獲得更高的回報(bào)來抵消投資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的回報(bào),這樣對(duì)現(xiàn)有的投資者可能會(huì)稀釋回報(bào)額。梅爾斯和麥杰耶夫(1984)后來發(fā)展他們所謂的融資順序理論融資指出:如果希望得到最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)，公司就會(huì)通過使用內(nèi)部基金滿足新的投資的渴

36、望，然后是發(fā)行低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的債券，而發(fā)行新的股票只是作為最后的選擇。在他們的理論里，沒有最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的企業(yè)是無法實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)值最大化的。財(cái)務(wù)經(jīng)理發(fā)行債券或者股票完全根據(jù)資本的成本。隨后的實(shí)證研究提供了證據(jù)。海韋杰和梁(1996)沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)實(shí)證支持這樣一個(gè)有序理論。然而埠斯在他們的十所公司的研究中找到了實(shí)證依據(jù)。弗蘭克和戈雅（2003) 通過1971至1998年上市美國(guó)公司的調(diào)查檢測(cè)了融資順序理論,并得出結(jié)論:理論并不被實(shí)證所證明。當(dāng)大</p&g

37、t;<p><b>　　2.2平衡理論</b></p><p>　　平衡理論認(rèn)為,肯定有種最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)能夠最大限度地實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化，但是平衡理論有很多種形態(tài)。</p><p>　　2.2.1稅賦保護(hù)的好處和財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的借貸成本</p><p>　　MM(1958)模型的非常重要的一個(gè)假設(shè)，是并沒有稅收。莫迪里亞尼和米勒(1963

38、) (1977年)在以后的工作里將稅收問題增加到原有的框架。這個(gè)新工作的啟示是,公司應(yīng)完全通過債務(wù)融資項(xiàng)目實(shí)現(xiàn)最大化公司價(jià)值。很明顯地這樣的矛盾所欠實(shí)際構(gòu)成只有其中一小部分企業(yè)的總資本。隨后的理論工從抵稅效應(yīng)和資本成本的平衡中尋找最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)。根據(jù)這條理論，從其產(chǎn)生的債務(wù)利益免稅，這意味著高負(fù)債比率會(huì)增加公司的價(jià)值。但該福利可以抵消成本,金融衰退可能損害企業(yè)的價(jià)值。因此,最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)是由免稅利益之間的平衡,負(fù)債和資本危機(jī)的成本債務(wù)。迪&

39、#183;安杰羅和麥蘇里斯(1980)，羅斯(1985)與他們(1994)表明，稅收的存在，對(duì)于一個(gè)擁有安全有形資產(chǎn)以及高的應(yīng)納稅所得額的公司為避免高納稅而采取高債務(wù)產(chǎn)權(quán)比率是有利的。對(duì)于一個(gè)績(jī)效低下,擁有更多的無形資產(chǎn)的公司來說，最好是依賴股權(quán)融資。</p><p>　　基于考慮抵稅效應(yīng)的這一理論的一個(gè)問題是，在遵循統(tǒng)一稅率的情況下，為什么公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)各地不盡相同。來自美國(guó)的實(shí)徵證據(jù)(科普蘭和韋斯頓，1992

40、)表明，公司所得稅形成后企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)并沒有改變多少。在澳大利亞,那里沒有雙所得課稅，在其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體(拉詹辛格嘉，1995)資本結(jié)構(gòu)狀況基本持平。布茲(2001)發(fā)現(xiàn)租稅減免在發(fā)展中國(guó)家有差異，在決定資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇中基本沒有影響。</p><p>　　2.2.2代理理論和資本結(jié)構(gòu)</p><p>　　即使在完全市場(chǎng)和沒有稅務(wù)影響下，代理理論表明,負(fù)債和權(quán)益適當(dāng)搭配，仍然是一種重要的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)

41、。一般來說，只要還款時(shí)間(有時(shí)某些條款)沒有到期。債權(quán)人享受固定回報(bào)的時(shí)間,但是沒有控制公司的權(quán)利。然而，如果公司存在財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)，債權(quán)人對(duì)公司有很大的影響力，但即使公司實(shí)力雄厚，債權(quán)人對(duì)于公司能否為新提議的方案計(jì)劃獲得額外的資金產(chǎn)生大的影響。例如，一個(gè)銀行為一個(gè)公司的擴(kuò)張貸款了，對(duì)于公司能否建立新的辦公樓就能有決定性的決定權(quán)利。</p><p>　　相反地：股東權(quán)益，特別是普通股票的權(quán)利——給予普通股持股股東這樣的

42、權(quán)利：股東大會(huì)投票表決權(quán)以及其他的公司處理權(quán)像公司合并以及部分資產(chǎn)處理等問題。股東們還可以得到股息或其它形式的資金分紅，如果公司清盤關(guān)閉，在公司支付所有債務(wù)和其他有效證券如優(yōu)先股（優(yōu)于普通股分配權(quán)）后享受凈資產(chǎn)。這兩個(gè)特權(quán)、選舉權(quán)和分紅權(quán)的權(quán)利和其他分配權(quán)，是普通股股東最典型的權(quán)利。</p><p>　　杰森和麥克林(1976)確定了兩種沖突的潛在來源。一方面，由于債務(wù)合同讓權(quán)益人激勵(lì)投資，債權(quán)人同權(quán)益所有者的沖

43、突上升。更多特定的債務(wù)合同提供,如果一個(gè)投資收益大回報(bào)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過面值的債券，股東權(quán)益者會(huì)捕獲大部分的利益。然而，如果投資失敗，因?yàn)閭说挠邢挢?zé)任，就要承擔(dān)失敗的后果。因此，權(quán)益所有者或許可以得到“失敗”后的利益，即投資很有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的項(xiàng)目,即使是它們的獲利情況在下降。這樣的投資導(dǎo)致債務(wù)價(jià)值的下降。權(quán)益所有者在失敗投資上的損失不能抵消債務(wù)成本及其收益。權(quán)益所有者正確預(yù)測(cè)的今后的經(jīng)濟(jì)行為。在這種情況下，比起其它的債務(wù)，債權(quán)人獲得就少一些。因此,由

44、于債務(wù)刺激引起的權(quán)益所有者對(duì)于獲利下降的投資行為所要承擔(dān)的損失就由發(fā)行債務(wù)的權(quán)益所有者來承擔(dān)。這種效果，一般稱為資產(chǎn)替代效應(yīng),是代理成本的債務(wù)融資。</p><p>　　另一方面,股東與管理者之間的沖突出現(xiàn)是由于管理者擁有少于100%的剩余索取權(quán)。因此，他們不承擔(dān)這些行為的全部成本。因而經(jīng)理不會(huì)對(duì)公司的資源管理投入跟多，卻將公司資源轉(zhuǎn)向個(gè)人利益，例如通過建造'帝國(guó)大廈'或‘特殊待遇'的高消

45、費(fèi)，像公司的噴氣式飛機(jī)、豪華辦公室等。經(jīng)理承擔(dān)從避免這些行為的全部費(fèi)用，但僅能獲得一小部分的收益。因此,經(jīng)理需要在承擔(dān)這些與公司價(jià)值有關(guān)的行為成本的基礎(chǔ)上，還要實(shí)現(xiàn)公司價(jià)值最大化。這種低效率隨著公司經(jīng)理所持股權(quán)份額的擴(kuò)大而降低。經(jīng)理在公司所持有的絕對(duì)投資，管理者的股權(quán)份額隨著公司的負(fù)債比率的增加而增加，減輕了經(jīng)理和股東之間的沖突的成本。況且，杰森指出（1986 ）,因?yàn)閭鶛?quán)人要求還現(xiàn)金, 它減少了管理者提供自由現(xiàn)金用于上述高消費(fèi)的追求行

46、為。管理者和股權(quán)持有人之間趨于更加和諧，這種情況有利于債務(wù)融資。</p><p>　　杰森和邁克林（1976，第117頁(yè)）認(rèn)為，最佳的資本結(jié)構(gòu)可以通過平衡債務(wù)代理成本和債務(wù)利益之間的關(guān)系得到</p><p>　　大量實(shí)證結(jié)果證實(shí)了這一分析。首先，人們期待債券合同中包括試圖阻止資產(chǎn)替代的功能，如利息覆蓋需求，禁止投資與新業(yè)務(wù)不相關(guān)的商業(yè)等。其次，行業(yè)中的資產(chǎn)替代的機(jī)會(huì)較有限，在其他條件不變的

47、情況下會(huì)有較高的債務(wù)水平。因此，舉例來說，這個(gè)理論預(yù)言適用于公用事業(yè)，銀行，在一些成熟的產(chǎn)業(yè)中缺少發(fā)展機(jī)遇的企業(yè)杠桿作用更明顯。第三，對(duì)于那些日常經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)中有較大的現(xiàn)金流量，同時(shí)想要獲得更多的債務(wù)的企業(yè)來說，低增長(zhǎng)率或者甚至負(fù)增長(zhǎng)率更加有利。沒有良好的投資前景大的現(xiàn)金流量為高消費(fèi)提供可能性，如高物質(zhì)消費(fèi)、額外的支出等。日益增加的債務(wù)減少了'自由現(xiàn)金'數(shù)額，增加了經(jīng)理的剩余索取權(quán)的部分所有權(quán)。根據(jù)詹森（1986），這些特色

48、產(chǎn)業(yè)包括鋼鐵，化工，釀造，煙草，電視和無線電廣播，以及木材和紙制品行業(yè)。該理論預(yù)測(cè)，這些行業(yè)擁有高杠桿率的特點(diǎn)。</p><p><b>　　公司控制</b></p><p>　　代理理論的一個(gè)局限是，哈特（1995a，1995 b）批評(píng)說，它假設(shè)代理問題可以得到緩解或消除，并且共同假定，經(jīng)理可以在未來的任何突發(fā)事件和狀態(tài)中知道應(yīng)該采取什么行動(dòng)。但是，設(shè)計(jì)或執(zhí)行這樣的

49、全面合同將非常昂貴（威廉姆森，1988）。也許不斷完善的和同更具有優(yōu)勢(shì)，分配股權(quán)持有人無法控制的，在合同給予債權(quán)人控制權(quán)的同時(shí)給股東權(quán)益所有者分配控制權(quán)（阿洪和博爾頓，1992）。這種不完全合同法將權(quán)益和債券視為有價(jià)證券。當(dāng)公司財(cái)政狀況穩(wěn)健，股票持有人擁有控制權(quán)。但是，債務(wù)拖欠還款將引發(fā)債務(wù)持有人的控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移。管理層裁員和資產(chǎn)清算就是不可避免的了。因此，管理層的要求會(huì)受到限制，以確保債務(wù)順利還款。</p><p>

50、;　　盡管他們?cè)跊_突中加深和債權(quán)角色中的方式不同，在股東和經(jīng)理之間兩個(gè)相關(guān)的模型仍共同關(guān)心著這個(gè)利益沖突。哈理斯和雷福（1990）假設(shè)，管理者總是希望繼續(xù)公司的現(xiàn)有業(yè)務(wù)，即使該公司的清算將是投資者的首選。但債務(wù)可以強(qiáng)制經(jīng)理清算公司，因?yàn)閭鶆?wù)違約會(huì)使管理者丟掉工作。最佳資本結(jié)構(gòu)在平衡滋長(zhǎng)的債務(wù)償還決策和研究成本之間取得。斯圖爾茲（1990），基于管理者總是希望投資提供資金以擴(kuò)大企業(yè)規(guī)模，盡管投資者可能傾向于較高的股息支付的假設(shè)建立了不同的