1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　‘The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park’: Can the Singapore Model of Development be Exported?——What Worked, What Di

2、dn’t, and Why.</p><p>　　Material Source: National University of Singapore Author: Han Minli</p><p>　　As China embarked on a steep process of macroeconomic reforms starting as early as Dec

3、ember 1978 during the Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Congress, some of the most pressing issues to address included the training and developing of a workforce that was capable of matching international

4、management standards and caliber. The purpose for setting these goals was so that it could increase its own domestic pool of managerial staff in both the public and private sectors to meet the v</p><p>　　The

5、 reform period witnessed a fundamental shift in the structuring of China’s organizational and business systems. Moving away from the wholly centralized government to a system that gave greater authority and responsibilit

6、y to local governments, enterprises and production units to set and achieve performance targets, this new policy direction was in part motivated by a shortage of adaptable and trained managerial personnel skilled in the

7、understanding and functioning of a market economy within </p><p>　　In the 1980s, China began to quickly embrace new and foreign management training programs. To further boost sentiments and support for the r

8、eform process, the Central government also introduced a series of legislations to strengthen acceptance and adherence in this respect and in 1984, a document relevant to China’s economic reform was passed, in which it em

9、phasized greater commitment towards the improvement of management training and development. The reform movement also benefited from the infl</p><p>　　As foreign investment and multi-lateral trade began to gr

10、ow in China, it became all the more apparent that there was a serious need for management education and large-scale knowledge transfer amongst personnel at all managerial levels in order to develop and implement new poli

11、cies that would be suitable for a market-led economy. This was more critical in the foreign investment and trade sector due to the nature of increasingly liberalized arrangements for international trade. Existing manager

12、ial</p><p>　　However no clear framework was set. Indeed, while the Central Government issued directives to embark on learning the management knowledge and skills of the West, there were no instructions as ho

13、w to acquire these skills while not contradicting the principles of the Chinese Government’s essentially socialist theories. Although the government linked work performance evaluation to acquisition of advanced managemen

14、t skills, most calls for such training and development were phrased vaguely, just like</p><p>　　Further complicating things was the Central government’s position towards learning from the West. On one hand,

15、they were keen to acquire the expertise knowledge of their Western counterparts, but on the other hand, they were wary that this would lead to corruption by Western values and ideologies. This ambiguous stance and the po

16、ssible consequences stemming from this was best demonstrated by how personnel sent to the UK and Canada for management training were sent to ‘re-education centres’ to st</p><p>　　As China opened up its marke

17、t and sped up economic reforms, two significant changes led to the official and explicit call by the Central Government for the transfer of management knowledge and skills from Western countries. First, international tra

18、de and foreign investment surged ahead and numerous joint ventures and the establishment of a large number of new foreign trading companies helped to enhance the reforms into the international market. Second, the Chinese

19、 Government began to accept priv</p><p>　　It was around this period that the subject of ‘software transference’ was conceptualized between the Singapore government and the local Suzhou government. The idea w

20、as for the Singapore government with its solid track record in developing top notch industrial parks and world class management standards of operation and human resource management, to impart its knowledge and experience

21、 in these areas to the Suzhou government. According to a number of the Chinese respondents interviewed, the Chinese</p><p>　　Adopting and learning the Singaporean way of management was more appealing and in

22、many ways, a more functional and acceptable choice for the local Suzhou Municipal Government and then subsequently for the Chinese Central Government as well. While the green light had been given by the Central governmen

23、t to proceed with experimenting with Western style business and management practices, there was still an air of caution and uncertainty as to which country’s model could be effectively adopted in Ch</p><p>　

24、　Another reason why the Chinese was keen to work with Singapore, was that it believed that a Singaporean approach to investment and industrial development would attract transnational investors from outside Asia better th

25、an how the other economic zones in China did at that point in time. Primarily, the Chinese government felt that investors were more familiar with Singapore’s style of management and business methods than traditional Chin

26、ese business methods, and hence the Singapore brand name coul</p><p>　　There were two levels of learning that the Suzhou government was keen to pursue with Singapore. The first consisted of hardware and urba

27、n planning expertise skills. This was to be centered on the Singapore’s infrastructure blueprint, in particular the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) model which changed the industrial and investment landscape of Singapore b

28、y providing advanced and specialized ready-built business and industrial facilities and spaces allowing foreign investors to set up operations i</p><p>　　The second level of learning, which this chapter focu

29、ses on, involves Singapore’s software capabilities. Software here refers to the business and administration methods utilized by the Singapore government and organizations, and encompasses the more abstract but equally im

30、portant area of management knowledge transfer and policy making processes which are tacit in nature. The Singapore government having achieved international recognition for its principals of meritocracy, efficiency and an

31、ti-corr</p><p>　　The direct benefits to the Chinese from such collaboration explain their eagerness towards the project. However, the rewards to the Singapore Government were not as tangible. In a typical co

32、rporate context, most management skills and processes are safeguarded carefully as they are potentially an important strategic resource against competition (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). It was thus unusual that the Singap

33、ore Government was so keen to transfer their know-how and managerial experience and cultur</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　“中國(guó)蘇州新加坡工業(yè)園區(qū)”新加坡模式能否被復(fù)制？——哪些可以，哪些不能，為什么</p><p>　　資

34、料來(lái)源:新加坡國(guó)立大學(xué) 作者：韓民利</p><p>　　早在1978年12月，黨的第十一屆三中全會(huì)通過(guò)了宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)改革政策，并解決了一些最緊迫的問(wèn)題，包括對(duì)勞動(dòng)力的培訓(xùn)與發(fā)展，從而使其具有符合國(guó)際管理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的素質(zhì)和才干。設(shè)定這些目標(biāo)的主要目的在于增加國(guó)內(nèi)公有經(jīng)濟(jì)和民營(yíng)經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域的技術(shù)人員，以滿足外國(guó)公司和政府多變有力的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這對(duì)中國(guó)全面融入國(guó)際金融與經(jīng)

35、濟(jì)體系起著至關(guān)重要的作用。</p><p>　　在改革期間，中國(guó)的組織結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)體制發(fā)生了根本性的轉(zhuǎn)變，不再是政府的完全中央集權(quán)政策，而是將更多的權(quán)力與職責(zé)下放給當(dāng)?shù)卣髽I(yè)和生產(chǎn)單位，讓其自行設(shè)定并實(shí)現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)目標(biāo)。這個(gè)新政策產(chǎn)生的部分原因在于我國(guó)中央政府和現(xiàn)存的勞動(dòng)力中缺少適應(yīng)能力強(qiáng)并接受過(guò)訓(xùn)練的管理人員來(lái)理解和把握市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。在認(rèn)識(shí)到這一新的尖端管理技能，科技熟練勞動(dòng)力和人力資源在經(jīng)濟(jì)的前進(jìn)與可持續(xù)發(fā)展中

36、的重要性后，國(guó)務(wù)院開(kāi)始優(yōu)先考慮員工管理能力的培訓(xùn)。</p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)80年代，中國(guó)開(kāi)始迅速接受新的外國(guó)管理培訓(xùn)方案。為了進(jìn)一步激勵(lì)人們并推動(dòng)改革進(jìn)程，國(guó)務(wù)院也出臺(tái)了一系列法律法規(guī)來(lái)加強(qiáng)這方面的接受和遵守，并于1984年通過(guò)了一份有關(guān)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的文件，其中強(qiáng)調(diào)了要把更多的精力放在對(duì)管理培訓(xùn)與發(fā)展的改善上。這一改革運(yùn)動(dòng)同樣也得益于一些全球性組織所設(shè)置的國(guó)際培訓(xùn)項(xiàng)目，如聯(lián)合國(guó)及其設(shè)立的許多專(zhuān)業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)，如中

37、國(guó)企業(yè)管理協(xié)會(huì)和中歐社區(qū)管理研究所等，這些都促使人們意識(shí)到管理培訓(xùn)的迫切性并為這一培訓(xùn)提供了有效建議和指導(dǎo)方針。（布拉寧， 1996）</p><p>　　隨著外來(lái)投資與多邊貿(mào)易在中國(guó)的不斷發(fā)展，為了發(fā)展和實(shí)施適合以市場(chǎng)為主導(dǎo)的經(jīng)濟(jì)新政策，管理階層人員間的管理教育和大范圍知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移的迫切需要變得越來(lái)越明顯。日益開(kāi)放的國(guó)際貿(mào)易的性質(zhì)更是加強(qiáng)了這一需要在外來(lái)投資與貿(mào)易行業(yè)的至關(guān)重要性。大部分現(xiàn)有的管理人員培訓(xùn)只是與社會(huì)

38、主義中央集權(quán)的計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)模式有關(guān)，這就使得中國(guó)提高在管理方面的能力，尤其是金融和會(huì)計(jì)職責(zé)、營(yíng)銷(xiāo)、人力資源管理領(lǐng)域等的能力更為重要。只有這樣，中國(guó)將來(lái)才能真正實(shí)行以市場(chǎng)為主導(dǎo)的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策。</p><p>　　然而，中國(guó)并沒(méi)有設(shè)立明確的實(shí)施框架與計(jì)劃。事實(shí)上，盡管?chē)?guó)務(wù)院發(fā)出指示要著手向西方學(xué)習(xí)管理知識(shí)和技能，但是卻沒(méi)有給出指導(dǎo)如何在不與中國(guó)政府社會(huì)主義本質(zhì)理論不相違背的前提下掌握這些管理方法與技巧。雖然政府把工作業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)

39、估與先進(jìn)管理技能的掌握程度連結(jié)在一起，但是很多有關(guān)這類(lèi)培訓(xùn)與發(fā)展的措辭都含糊不清，就像當(dāng)時(shí)的總理趙紫陽(yáng)在1984年5月召開(kāi)的第六屆全國(guó)人民代表大會(huì)第二次會(huì)議上所作的以下報(bào)告：“從事經(jīng)濟(jì)工作干部必須學(xué)習(xí)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理和現(xiàn)代科學(xué)技術(shù)。他們所作的學(xué)習(xí)研究記錄應(yīng)成為考核他們工作和晉升工資檔次的重要標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。為了獲得實(shí)際成果，這種培訓(xùn)的內(nèi)容和要求應(yīng)隨員工的職位及年齡的不同而不同。從現(xiàn)在起，在招聘職工時(shí)，企業(yè)必須為候選人提供崗前培訓(xùn)，然后招聘那些考試中表現(xiàn)優(yōu)

40、秀的人?！?lt;/p><p>　　把東西進(jìn)一步復(fù)雜化，是中國(guó)政府在向西方學(xué)習(xí)中的立場(chǎng)。一方面，他們都渴望獲得西方同行的專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)，但另一方面，他們又擔(dān)心自己會(huì)被西方價(jià)值觀和意識(shí)形態(tài)所腐蝕。這種模棱兩可的的立場(chǎng)以及由此而產(chǎn)生的后果在20實(shí)際90年代早期，有關(guān)人員如何在被送往英國(guó)和加拿大參加管理培訓(xùn)返回中國(guó)后又去“再教育中心”重新學(xué)習(xí)中國(guó)共產(chǎn)主義意識(shí)形態(tài)這一事情中得到了最好的體現(xiàn)（布拉寧，1996年）。中國(guó)政府承認(rèn)，西方

41、資本主義社會(huì)的管理知識(shí)可以被用來(lái)改變和完善的我國(guó)的管理結(jié)構(gòu)和風(fēng)格，但它的現(xiàn)代化并不意味著中國(guó)也將成為“西化”。</p><p>　　隨著中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的開(kāi)放和經(jīng)濟(jì)改革進(jìn)程的加快，國(guó)務(wù)院引起的兩個(gè)重要轉(zhuǎn)變促使管理知識(shí)和技能的轉(zhuǎn)移。首先，國(guó)際貿(mào)易和外國(guó)投資迅猛發(fā)展，并且眾多的合資企業(yè)和大量新的外貿(mào)公司的建立極大地促使了其向國(guó)際市場(chǎng)的改革。第二，中國(guó)政府開(kāi)始接受私營(yíng)企業(yè)，這對(duì)社會(huì)主義性質(zhì)的國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)是一個(gè)很重要的讓步。1992

42、年被證明是在改進(jìn)管理方法運(yùn)動(dòng)中的關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)。這對(duì)鼓勵(lì)西方管理方法的采用上是一個(gè)新的嘗試。</p><p>　　就在這個(gè)時(shí)期，新加坡政府和當(dāng)?shù)靥K州政府之間的“軟件轉(zhuǎn)讓”主題被概念化。這個(gè)想法是為了讓有良好跟蹤記錄的新加坡能夠憑借其在開(kāi)發(fā)一流的工業(yè)園區(qū)和世界一流的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理和人力資源管理水平將其在這些領(lǐng)域的知識(shí)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)傳授給蘇州政府。根據(jù)對(duì)很多中國(guó)人的采訪，中國(guó)政府認(rèn)為新加坡的發(fā)展和管理模式是高效率、可靠性、透明度和重要性的

43、代表，它是一個(gè)看似所有層級(jí)在政策制定和執(zhí)行中都是統(tǒng)一并且團(tuán)結(jié)在一起的：這些優(yōu)點(diǎn)也是吸引很多西方企業(yè)和國(guó)家的地方。為了與中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革運(yùn)動(dòng)保持一致，蘇州政府在這一轉(zhuǎn)變中起了很大的幫助，為他的居民和工人提供了很大的動(dòng)力和機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)掌握現(xiàn)代西化的管理技能和實(shí)踐機(jī)會(huì)，極大地促進(jìn)了蘇州整體基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的發(fā)展和經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)，從而使蘇州較其他縣市在吸引外國(guó)投資者上更具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，并提高了他在國(guó)內(nèi)外的形象。講到一個(gè)新加坡官僚，作為探索性對(duì)話進(jìn)程起步階段的一部分，蘇

44、州領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人就會(huì)熱衷于“在歷史上留下了印記” 。在討論的最初階段，他們對(duì)遷移方案以及計(jì)劃的合作模式的期望都很高，無(wú)論它的硬件部分還是軟件方面，如果被證明在提高管理風(fēng)格和蘇州的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的發(fā)展能夠成功地達(dá)到到世界一流水準(zhǔn)，該方案就會(huì)被應(yīng)用到中國(guó)其他地區(qū)。</p><p>　　樹(shù)立和學(xué)習(xí)新加坡的管理方式是更具吸引力，在很多方面，為蘇州市政府提供一個(gè)更加實(shí)用、更讓人可以接受的選擇，隨后也可以為中國(guó)中央政府提供一個(gè)選擇。而中央

45、政府同意繼續(xù)使用西方風(fēng)格的商務(wù)和管理方法的實(shí)驗(yàn)，但對(duì)于哪個(gè)國(guó)家的模式可以有效地在中國(guó)通過(guò)的，而又不違反中國(guó)的執(zhí)政的政治制度和社會(huì)的社會(huì)主義原則，氣氛仍然是謹(jǐn)慎的和不確定的。新加坡有效控制其公民的軟獨(dú)裁政體結(jié)構(gòu)和管理因其有限的民主改革和民主解釋被西方媒體批評(píng)為是違反了西方傳統(tǒng)的理想和做法的規(guī)范。不過(guò)，新加坡政府仍然設(shè)法將沒(méi)有天然資源的后水島改造成該地區(qū)擁有國(guó)際商業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和高學(xué)歷可移動(dòng)辦公的最重要最先進(jìn)的金融中心之一。它由此引起來(lái)自批評(píng)和支持

46、者的如潮的好評(píng)和欽佩。結(jié)合上述這些原因和鄧小平對(duì)新加坡的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)模式的個(gè)人崇拜，舒緩了本地和中央民族政府過(guò)于癡迷西方的恐懼。</p><p>　　中國(guó)熱衷于和新加坡合作的另一個(gè)原因，在于新加坡的投資方法和工業(yè)發(fā)展將比中國(guó)其他經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展地區(qū)的發(fā)展方法更吸引來(lái)自亞洲以外地區(qū)的跨國(guó)投資者。首先，中方政府認(rèn)為，比起中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)營(yíng)方法，這些投資者更熟悉新加坡的管理風(fēng)格和經(jīng)營(yíng)方法，因此新加坡品牌名稱更加可以吸引那些正猶豫著是否

47、要投資中國(guó)的投資者。蘇州政府在積極追趕新加坡上，主要有兩個(gè)層次的學(xué)習(xí)。</p><p>　　第一個(gè)包括硬件和城市規(guī)劃的專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)技能。這將被集中在新加坡的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的藍(lán)圖，特別是裕廊鎮(zhèn)管理局（裕廊）模型，它通過(guò)提供了先進(jìn)的和專(zhuān)門(mén)準(zhǔn)備興建的商業(yè)和工業(yè)設(shè)施和空間，允許外國(guó)投資者在很短的時(shí)間內(nèi)設(shè)立機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行運(yùn)作，從而改變了新加坡的工業(yè)和投資藍(lán)圖。通過(guò)提供提供諸如大大減少對(duì)土地、廠房，租賃計(jì)劃的審批和簽注申請(qǐng)時(shí)間這些良好的商業(yè)

48、服務(wù)和后勤援助，通過(guò)這些，裕廊鎮(zhèn)管理局促使新加坡成為一個(gè)好的外國(guó)投資者選擇的投資地。這些裕廊舉措很大程度上為新加坡拉入新的和可持續(xù)的外國(guó)投資者，蘇州政府希望他們也能制定出一項(xiàng)符合國(guó)際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的投資，使投資者能夠成長(zhǎng)并變得更具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。</p><p>　　第二個(gè)層次的學(xué)習(xí)涉及新加坡的軟件功能。軟件這里指的是由新加坡政府和組織使用的商業(yè)管理方法，包括管理知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移和決策過(guò)程，它雖然是抽象的但在本質(zhì)上是默契的有同等重要的地

49、位。新加坡政府已實(shí)現(xiàn)的績(jī)效制，高效率和反腐敗措施以及它的快速性已得到國(guó)際認(rèn)可，并以其獨(dú)特的有別于傳統(tǒng)西方模式的經(jīng)濟(jì)和城市規(guī)劃的藍(lán)圖，促使新加坡轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐粋€(gè)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)國(guó)。這是社會(huì)主義中國(guó)政府可以借鑒的一個(gè)優(yōu)秀的例子。特別是，新加坡的經(jīng)驗(yàn)向中國(guó)證明，任何短缺或外國(guó)投資者對(duì)東道國(guó)的政治制度的批評(píng)是可以反駁，并為外商投資提供有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和有效的商業(yè)和投資環(huán)境。因此中國(guó)的重點(diǎn)在于采用、修改，并把新加坡有關(guān)治理公有經(jīng)濟(jì)和民營(yíng)經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的經(jīng)驗(yàn)付諸到蘇州的管理

50、實(shí)踐中，以提高其生產(chǎn)力、生產(chǎn)效率和透明度。</p><p>　　中國(guó)從這類(lèi)合作中得到的直接利益解釋了他們對(duì)這項(xiàng)目熱情的原因。然而，對(duì)新加坡政府的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)并不像有形的。在一個(gè)典型的企業(yè)環(huán)境中，大多數(shù)管理技能和程序都得到了有效的保障，因?yàn)樗鼈兪菨撛诘姆锤?jìng)爭(zhēng)的重要戰(zhàn)略資源（卡曼和普拉哈拉德，1996）。因此，新加坡政府如此熱衷于將其專(zhuān)門(mén)知識(shí)和管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)和文化給中國(guó)并Xīnjiāpō zhèngfǔ rúc

51、ǐ rèzhōng yú jiāng qí zhuānmén zhīshì hé guǎnlǐ jīngyàn, duì zhōngguó wénhuà字典 - 查看字典詳細(xì)內(nèi)容不期待接受任何形式付款的‘一面倒’安排是不尋常的。根據(jù)新加坡受訪者的一些回答，新加坡政府和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人認(rèn)為國(guó)家一級(jí)的園區(qū)項(xiàng)目是有必要和重要的，因?yàn)樗梢宰鳛橹?/p>