1、天津大學(xué)博士學(xué)位論文基于博弈論的虛擬組織理論研究姓名：邢永杰申請(qǐng)學(xué)位級(jí)別：博士專業(yè)：管理科學(xué)與工程指導(dǎo)教師：張世英20031101AbstractAccompanyingwiththeglobalizationintheinformationage，studiesonthetheoryofvirtuallyorganizing(especiallythemanagement)havebecomeafrontiertopicinthear

2、eaofmanagementmadbusinessItisveryimportantbothintheoryandapplicationtomakeathoroughstudyonthemanagementissuesofvirtuallyorganizationBasedoilthetheoryoforgmfization，strategicmanagementandgametheorythisdissertationmakesbot

3、htheoreticalandempiricalstudiesOiltheaspectsabouttheconceptofvirtuallyorganizing，theoreticalorientation，strategicsignificance，decision—making，choiceofpartners，organizationalconstruction，administrationandprofitsharing，etc

4、FinallysomeconclusionsaregivenaccordinglyThemainorigiilalityofthedissertation1slistedasfollows：1Accordingtoweaknessoftheexistingliteratureinthisfield，therelationbetweenvirtualenterpriseandvirtuallyorganizationisdwelledoi

5、l，andtheorganizingofmanagementprocessisdefinedasthebeginningofthestudyonvirtualorganizationT11isstudyisthenembodiedintheframeworkofmanagementtheory2Therelationbetweenvirtualorganizationandstrategymanagement，aswellasthefa

6、ctorsofenviromnent，isdiscussedMoreoverthemacrostructureandmicrostructureofvirtualorganizationarediscussedii“1thisdissertationAmongothers，theprocess—basedvirtualorganization，therelationbetweenvirtualorganizationandstrateg

7、icfiexibilitytheadvantagesofvirtualorganizationtomaintaintheorganizationflexibilityaswellastheobstaclesofbusinesslineadjustment，areofspecialfocus3Comparingwithenterprisegroup，thecharactersofdecisionpowerdistributionwithi

8、nvirtualorganizationisanalyzed。Alsocomparedaretheconstructioncostandmanagementcostofbothkindsoffirmforlnation4Therelationshipbetweenthevirtuallyorganizingandthecorecompetencyisdiscussed，madapyramidmodelofcorecompetencyis

9、putforwardFurthermore，therelationbetweenthecorecompetenceofcooperativepartaaersandtheGorecompetenceofvirtualorganizationiswelldefined5Byusingthemethodofgametheorythecharactersandsolutionofcorrelatedequilibriumaredwelledo

10、n，andtheconclusionsareextendedtogeneralizedcorrelatedequilibriumThetransformmionbetweenthecostsoffailuretocooperateandthecostsofdelaytocooperateincollective—choiceisprovenbyaquantitativeapproach6Applyingdynamicgamemodelt

11、oanalysetheprofitdistributioilofvirtualorganization，madthelinfitationofprofit—distributingbasedontheproportionofinvestmentisuncoveredTherelationbetweenprofitdistributionandassignmentofprincipalshipisalsoanalysedTheproble